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Optimal Deterrence and Accidents
To Fleming James, Jr., il miglior jabbro
Guido Calabresit
Much recent writing on the fault system and on strict liability has
concerned itself with the goal of minimizing primary accident costs,
that is, the sum of accident costs and of accident prevention costs.'
Perhaps because this literature has been genuinely interdisciplinary,
the writers have frequently seemed simply to be firing past each other.
2
Words like "negligence," "contributory negligence," or "strict liabili-
ty" have been used in different senses by different authors, and light
and misunderstanding in roughly equal parts have predictably resulted.
Because I too have been guilty of using these concepts in ways which
could be misinterpreted,3 I think it worthwhile to try to explain what
I view the fault system and strict liability to mean in terms of the
goal of minimizing accident and accident prevention costs. For short
I shall call this goal "optimal deterrence." A clear mapping of the con-
cepts will be an appropriate tribute to my teacher, Fleming James, Jr.,
whose work has combined lucidity with originality to an extraordinary
degree. Should I fail and simply add another bit of mud to the waters,
I will at least have demonstrated how very rare are Jimmy's qualities
as a scholar and writer.
t John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. This is only one of the goals which might appropriately be achieved by a legal
system dealing with accidents. I have discussed other goals and their interrelations in
THE CoS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) [hereinafter cited as
CosTs], and other articles, e.g., Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi-Hirschoff]; Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi-Melamed].
2. See, e.g., Brown, Towards an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323
(1973); CosTs, supra note 1; Calabresi-Hirschoff, supra note 1; Diamond, Single Activity
Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107 (1974); Diamond, Accident Law and Resource Allocation,
5 BELL J. ECON. & MAN. SCL 366 (1974); Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Negligence]; Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Strict Liability].
3. I have used the term "strict liability" to mean systems in which the decision as to
which party to an accident was to bear the financial burden of the accident is based on
which party is best suited to make a cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and
accident prevention costs. See Calabresi-Hirschoff, supra note 1. My use of the term "strict
liability" has been read by some to imply virtually absolute injurer liability. See, e.g.,
Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 206-07, 213-14. See also pp. 665-68 infra.
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I. The Fault System's Initial "Non-Fault" Assumption
The fault system, viewed entirely as a system for achieving "optimal
deterrence," must be taken as making the initial assumption that, other
things being equal, the victim (or more accurately, the class to which
the victim belongs) 4 can best decide whether it is worthwhile to pre-
vent the accident. Whenever we lack information as to who, if any-
body, ought to have avoided the accident, the loss lies where it falls,
that is, on the injured. This will result in accident avoidance only if
those in the class to which the victim belongs believe that prevention,
even if costly, is more desirable than bearing the risk, and occasionally
the actual cost, of such accidents.
This "no-liability" rule, with which the fault system begins but
where it by no means ends, can achieve "optimal deterrence" only if
we make either of two incredible assumptions. The first incredible
assumption postulates that the victim-class is always the category which
can (a) best decide whether accident avoidance is worthwhile, and (b)
best accomplish such worthwhile avoidance. The second incredible as-
sumption is the familiar old chestnut, the absence of transaction costs.5
If the victim-class had perfect knowledge and could, without adminis-
trative costs, bribe injurer-classes to avoid all those accidents which
the injurer-classes could avoid more cheaply than the victim-class, then
"optimal deterrence" would be achieved."
II. Negligence: The "Regulatory" Determination
The fault system does not, as everyone knows, stop with the simplis-
tic no-liability rule. It shifts losses from the victim-class to the injurer-
class when the injurer is negligent. In terms of the goal of "optimal
4. This "class" includes those who are in the same insurance category, and those who,
though uninsured,. should view the accident risks and costs to themselves as roughly the
same as those the victim actually bore. "Class" in this sense has no socio-economic
connotation.
5. The concept of transaction costs is introduced in Coase's pathbreaking article, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). As used by Coase, the absence of trans-
action costs implies that there are no impediments whatsoever to bargaining. This in-
cludes a requirement of perfect knowledge. In my article, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation, and Liability Rules, 11 J. LAw & EcoN. 67 (1968), I renounce some early doubts
and explain why I agree that in the absence of transaction costs as defined by Coase, the
sum of accident and accident prevention costs would be minimized regardless of which
party to an accident were burdened with its costs. Since knowledge is never perfect, and
since virtually all transactions entail some costs (any market entails some organizational
costs), the placement of liability is frequently crucial to the achievement of "optimal
deterrence." Id.
6. Precisely the same incredible assumptions are required to make the converse of the
no-liability rule, which some writers have wrongly called strict liability, accomplish this
same goal. Such a rule would impose accident costs on the injurer in all cases. See p. 665
infra.
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deterrence," this step implies a deviation from the basic notion that
the victim always knows best what accidents are worth avoiding. The
injurer should avoid the accident whenever a jury, court, or legislature
decides that accident prevention by him is socially more desirable than
accident costs and that he ought to have known it. In a very rough
way, this is what the Learned Hand definition of negligence, and
its precursor, the Terry definition, are about.
7
Were this all there was to the fault system, the goal I have been
discussing would be approached, though not necessarily accomplished,
whenever the tort law equivalent of a regulatory agency (a jury, court,
or legislature) (a) correctly made the cost-benefit analysis between pre-
vention and accident costs, and (b) succeeded in enforcing its con-
clusion. In these two cases, which are properly characterized as requir-
ing the "absence of errors by regulators," all accident costs which are
worth preventing by injurer action alone would be avoided. This fol-
lows from the absence of regulatory error. Moreover, the victims would
avoid those accident costs which they foresaw injurers would not be
induced to avoid, but which they nonetheless believed to be worth
preventing. This is implicit in the fact that unless injurer "fault" is
found, accident costs would lie, as in a no-liability system, on the
victims.
This result fails to satisfy the goal of "optimal deterrence" in several
respects. First, there is no assurance that those accident costs which
will be avoided will be avoided most cheaply. Assume, simplistically,
that an accident "costs" $100. Assume also that the injurer can avoid
this accident by spending $80. The rule would induce injurer avoid-
ance-at an expense of $80-even if the victim could, let us assume,
avoid the accident costs by spending only $60.
In addition, some accident costs which are worth avoiding will still
not be avoided. They may not be avoided because of victim error,
7. See Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1915); Conway v. O'Brien, Il1 F.2d 611,
612 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941) ("The degree
of care demanded of a person... is the resultant of three factors: the likelihood that his
conduct will injure others, taken with the seriousness of the injury if it happens, and
balanced against the interest he must sacrifice to avoid the risk."); U.S. v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
I do not mean to suggest that the fault system actually attempts to apply the Learned
Hand test precisely even were it possible to do so. Other goals of tort law, which I have
discussed in CoSS, supra note 1, would make it extremely unlikely that any s'uch simplistic
definition of negligence would actually be applied by juries however much a court might
instruct them to do so. I discuss the Learned Hand test in this article because to the
extent that the fault system does concern itself with minimizing accident costs and ac-
cident prevention costs, Hand's definition of negligence is a crucial part of that concern;
cf. Posner, Negligence, supra note 2. Diamond, in his brilliant article Accident Law and
Resource Allocation, supra note 2, discusses the effects of different negligence tests on
resource allocation.
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either in guessing what the regulators would compel injurers to do,
or in comparing avoidance costs with accident costs. Moreover, and
from a theoretical point of view more importantly, costs may also
not be avoided because efficient avoidance often requires costly action
by both victim and injurer. Assume, again simplistically, an accident
cost of $100. Assume also that injurers alone could avoid the accident
at a cost of $120, while victims alone could avoid the accident at a
cost of $130. Assume finally, consistently with the first two assump-
tions, that injurer expenses of $40 and victim expenses of $50 would
serve to prevent the $100 accident. Under the fault system thus far
described, the $100 accident would take place because the regulators
would not find the injurer at fault (they would compare $100 accident
costs with $120 injurer-prevention costs), while the victims, who com-
pared the $100 accident cost with the $130 prevention cost would not
find prevention worthwhile. Yet the $100 accident could have been
avoided by a joint expenditure of $90.
Of course, were we to postulate no transaction costs in this last
example, the goal of "optimal deterrence" would be achieved. The
victim would spend $90, $50 on his own and $40 to bribe the injurer
to take safety measures. The accident would be avoided and $10 would
be saved. But transaction costs are always present; if they were not,
any liability rule would achieve the minimization of the sum of ac-
cident and accident' prevention costs." When transaction costs are rela-
tively small (less than $10 in our example), accident costs would be
avoided (victim would pay $50, bribe injurer to spend $40, and incur
the transaction costs of less than $10, thereby saving something against
the $100 accident).9 But even then our objective would not be ac-
complished; a system which allocated $40 in costs to the injurer and
$50 to the victim could have avoided the accident costs with lower pre-
vention costs, since the transaction costs would also have been avoided.
Despite all these imperfections, the introduction of "fault" would
probably improve an "absolute" no-liability system. It would increase
the chances that we would approach the goal of "optimal deterrence."
Our chances would be similarly improved, however, if the court, jury,
8. See note 5 supra.
9. Assume, for example, two householders who are bothered by a neon sign belonging
to a neighboring factory. The bother is worth $100 to the householders. Planting trees by
the householders at a cost of anything less than $100 will not, by itself, block the sign.
Moving the sign a distance sufficient to eliminate the bother will cost the factory more
than $100. A small movement of the sign, costing the factory $40, together with the
planting of some trees, costing the householders $50, will completely eliminate the bother.
If the "transaction costs" of getting the householders and the factory together are less
than $10, the bother will be eliminated.
659
HeinOnline -- 84 Yale L.J. 659 1974-1975
The Yale Law Journal
or legislative determination that injurer behavior was not worthwhile
resulted in the imposition of appropriate fines or penalties, regardless
of whether or not actual injuries occurred. The regulators could gauge
the dangerousness and utility of the potential injurer's behavior and
impose a fine or penalty whose size would depend on the magnitude
of that undesirability based on risk of harm, rather than on the mag-
nitude of the harm that occurred. The Wagon Mound would be
brought to its logical conclusion,' ° and the nonfault, no-liability sys-
tem of market incentives on the victim would be modified by collec-
tive deterrence of injurer behavior deemed not to be socially worth-
while. 1
III. The Effect of the Negligence Determination:
A Return to Market Incentives
The fault system does not, however, try to coerce compliance with
its collective determinations that some injurer conduct is not worth-
while. Instead, after imposing an overlay of collective 'evaluation of
injurer conduct on its original structure as a market incentive system
with cues solely to victims, the fault system reverses direction again.
Rather than penalizing wrongdoing injurer-categories regardless of the
degree of harm which occurs, the fault system simply makes injurers
pay the costs of the harm they cause, 12 if the jury, court, or legislature
has deemed that they should have prevented the accident.
The effect of this extraordinary return to a market approach is that
the decision by the regulators does not bind the injurers in any way.
The collective decision, that avoidance by the injurer was worthwhile
and that the injurer should have known it, is now little more than
the basis for reversing the original judgment as to who could best
10. Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts, Dock & Eng'r Co., Ltd. (The Wagon
Mound), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.). The House of Lords in the Wagon Mound took the posi-
tion that damages should be limited to those foreseeable by the injurer. In effect, it
held that the actual harm which occurred was irrelevant if the injurer could not have
foreseen it. The fact that the victim might also not have foreseen it was ignored. Indeed,
the very presence of an injured victim was all but ignored. The reasoning of the case was
that foreseeable risk and undesirability of behavior should determine damages even if
greater harm occurred. The same reasoning would lead to the conclusion that foreseeable
risk and undesirability of behavior should determine damages even if less harm or no
harm occurred. In both cases the presence or absence of a seriously injured victim would
be irrelevant. For all its self-importance, the Wagon Mound has had remarkably little
significance in this country.
11. Collective deterrence is employed in even the most market-oriented systems of law.
No one would argue that two-year-old children should be permitted to drive simply be-
cause they or their parents can afford to compensate those they injure by driving. If a
two-year-old is encouraged by its parents to drive, the parents are subject to punishment
regardless of whether an accident occurs. See generally Cosrs, supra note 1.
12. At this level of analysis, let us assume generally in a "but for" sense.
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make the cost-benefit analysis. Fault and the loss are assigned to the
injurer rather than the victim; the analysis is now assumed to be best
made by him. If future injurers agree with the regulators that avoid-
ance is worthwhile, accident costs will be avoided. If they disagree,
they are still free to pay the accident costs and bear the generally
minor stigma of being called "at fault." Once the system returns to
a market approach, the costs the injurers must pay will be those their
negligence caused, for that is generally the easiest case-by-case way
to burden them with those costs relevant to making the cost-benefit
analysis. 13 But the crucial point is that after seemingly adopting col-
lective determinations of costs and benefits at level two, the fault system
at level three again becomes a system of market incentives.
If we assume that the regulators make no errors in measuring costs,
this turnabout does not help achieve our objective of minimizing the
sum of accident and prevention costs; indeed, it hinders it. It adds
the possibility that injurers will, through error, fail to avoid those ac-
cident costs which are cheaper to prevent than to compensate for. If
the regulators are right that the accident costs were worth avoiding,
it makes no sense to give the injurers an independent opportunity to
review the issue. 14 If, instead, we assume the possibility of regulator
error, the turnabout may or may not help. To the extent that the
error is in overestimating prevention costs, fault will not be found be-
cause avoidance will be deemed too costly. Consequently, the loss will
lie on the victim, and we will be no nearer our objective than before.
To the extent the error lies in underestimating 1revention costs, the
turnabout does permit injurers to choose the cheaper alternative of
compensating rather than preventing the costs.
The very fact, however, that the benefit this third level confers on
the fault system presupposes regulator error should make us skeptical
of both levels two and three. Whenever we believe such error is un-
likely, giving injurers a second chance is silly. Whenever, instead, we
believe that regulator error is likely, our object should be to find a
rule which protects against regulator overestimate of prevention costs
13. Again, "cause" here means generally in a "but for" sense. See note 16 infra.
14. Of course one could view even criminal law as giving the potential law breaker a
"choice" of whether it is worth his while to comply, with the law, or to break it and
"pay" the penalty. There is, however, a significant difference between situations, like the
standard "unintentional tort," in which actors are in effect asked to compare compensa-
tion costs with prevention costs and encouraged to choose the cheaper of the two, and
those like the standard "crime," in which the penalty is not directly linked to the harm
done in the particular case and in which severe stigma is added to the nominal penalty.
Only in the latter does society try, as best it can, to enforce its collective judgment as to
whethcr the "crime" is worth its costs; cf. Calabresi-Melamed, supra note 1, at 1124-27; R.
POSNER, ECONOMfic ANALYSIS OF LAW 66-69, 357-73 (1972). See also p. 665 infra.
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no less than regulator underestimate of these costs. Applying the negli-
gence test, which fails to do this, is equally silly.
That errors of all sorts are frequent should, of course, be obvious.
If neither regulator error nor injurer error existed, there would be no
accident costs which, given our goal, would require compensation.
Fault would never be found by perfect regulators unless avoidance
were cheaper than compensation. And in all cases where avoidance
was cheaper than compensation, unerring injurers would choose to
avoid. Hence, compensation would never be the result. One can ex-
plain some recoveries on the basis of other goals, such as the desire
to spread losses. Even if one does this, however, it is hard to avoid
the conclusion that regulator and injurer errors are all-pervasive.
IV. The Role of Contributory Negligence
Traditionally, however, the fault system modifies the liability de-
cision through the doctrine of contributory negligence, which bars re-
covery by victims who are themselves at fault. Contributory negligence,
viewed from the perspective of "optimal deterrence," could be restated
in the following way: If a regulator finds that the prevention of acci-
dent costs by the victim was worthwhile, then the loss remains on the
victim even if prevention by the injurer was also worthwhile.
Again, this involves the introduction of collective decisionmakers,
and again their effect is only to determine who must make the cost-
benefit analysis, even though the decision is couched in terms of how
the analysis should come out. In other words, there is a reintroduction
of the pattern of reasoning which we saw at levels two and three, but
now applied to the victim, thereby countering any level two decision
to place the incentive on the injurer.
If interpreted strictly, contributory negligence does nothing to fur-
ther the objective of "optimal deterrence." In particular, it does not
avoid the danger of creating incentives to avoid accidents in relatively
expensive ways. Assume again a $100 accident. Assume injurer-alone
avoidance costs of $60, and victim-alone avoidance costs of $80. In the
absence of errors, the contributory negligence rule puts the incentive
to avoid the accident on the victim, and results in avoidance costs of
$80, even though an expenditure of $60 would have sufficed. Similarly,
the strict contributory negligence rule is useless when avoidance re-
quires joint injurer-victim action. The $100 accident which the injurer
alone can avoid at $120, and the victim alone can avoid at $130, but
which can be avoided by victim expense of $50 together with injurer
Vol. 84: 656, 1975
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expense of $40, will still not be avoided. No injurer negligence, and no
victim contributory negligence, will be found, and unless transaction-
bribery costs are very low, the victim will find it cheaper to bear the
accident costs despite the theoretical availability of efficient prevention
through joint action.
Of course, contributory negligence may not operate this way in prac-
tice. Perhaps it not only considers whether avoidance by victims is
worthwhile, but also which party could avoid the accident more
cheaply, as some writers have suggested.15 Perhaps comparative negli-
gence would go still further and permit the kind of cost sharing I have
described above. But before we indulge in these particular dreams,
we must confront an embarrassing reality. If we are concerned with
the relative ability of injurers and victims, jointly or alone, to avoid
accidents cheaply, or more fundamentally, their relative ability to
decide whether avoidance is worthwhile, why should we go through
the particular contortions required by an analysis which evades these
questions and asks instead whether avoidance by a single party-category
alone is worthwhile? Yet that is precisely what the language of negli-
gence, contributory negligence, and even comparative negligence be-
gins by asking.
V. Proximate Cause and Assumption of Risk:
Market Deterrence Again
I say "begins," for once again the fault system, after seeming to rely
on collective deterrence and "regulator" decisions as to what behavior
is worthwhile, limits the effect of those decisions by adopting two doc-
trines which emphasize market incentives and deterrence: "proximate
cause," and "assumption of risk" in its primary sense.
Even if an injurer is negligent, the loss must lie on the victim (who
is free from negligence) unless the injurer's negligence proximately
caused the injury. Why? The collective decisionmakers have found that
injurer avoidance is worthwhile. They have found that victim avoid-
ance is not. Yet the existence of some better avoider, or lack of fore-
seeability, or great distance in time and space, will serve to place
the loss, that is, the incentive to avoid such accidents, back with the
victim. Conversely, a victim who, according to the collective decision-
makers, should have avoided accident costs-that is, was negligent-
will nonetheless be allowed to recover if time, space, or lack of fore-
15. See, e.g., Posner, Negligence, supra note 2, at 40.
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seeability suggest that his negligence was not sufficiently proximate
to the injury to be "contributory."
This article is not the place to go in any detail into my view of the
role of proximate cause.' 0 It is enough here to suggest that implicit
in the concept is a determination of the relative injurer, victim, and
third party ability to decide whether avoidance of accident costs is
desirable. The requirement of proximate cause therefore suggests that
such a determination is worth making even after the regulators have
decided that accident cost avoidance is worthwhile, i.e., found the in-
jurer, the victim, or both negligent.
Similarly, the doctrine of assumption of risk, in its primary mean-
ing,17 suggests that important elements of market deterrence adhere
to the fault system. An injurer does something which the regulators
can say he ought not to have done; to some potential victims the
injurer behavior would have been negligent because the costs of avoid-
ance would have been less than the accident costs; once again, it could
not be said by the regulators that the actual victim should have avoided
the accident (that is, there was no contributory negligence). 8 Yet once
again the decision is made to leave the loss on the victim. Why? Tak-
ing the doctrine literally: because of the victim's knowledge and choice-
making potential. Even though the injurer-class, according to the
regulators, ought to have decided to avoid the accident, nevertheless
the victim-class was in a better position to decide whether avoidance
was in fact worthwhile and therefore the incentive should lie with it.
VI. The Fault System's Mirror Image
This extraordinary, Janus-like system-constantly shifting between
regulatory decisions which would seem to imply coercion, and non-
coercive incentives based on those decisions-is in rough sketch the
fault system. To understand it better we should look briefly at its
16. There is much in the concept that involves goals not germane to this article, and
much that is germane which would nonetheless take me too far afield. My views on
causation and torts were the basis of an as yet unpublished series of Harris Lectures,
delivered at the University of Indiana Law School (Bloomington), Oct. 3, 4, 7, 1974.
17. "Assumption of risk" has at times been used to mean that victim behavior is
"unreasonable" or "undesirable" or even "grossly negligent." This use of the doctrine,
which has been frequently criticized, see, e.g., Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc.,
31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90 (1959), is commonly termed the "secondary meaning" of the
doctrine. The "primary meaning" of the doctrine involves no judgment on the worth-
iness of victim behavior. Under it the victim is barred because he "freely" accepted a risk
which the injurer had a "right" to impose. This, it is said, "negates" injurer "duty" and
hence injurer "negligence". Id.
18. If there was contributory negligence, if avoidance by the victim would cost less
than the accident, we would not be talking about assumption of risk in its primary sense.
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mirror image, at what some writers (unfortunately, in my view) call
"strict liability with contributory negligence."' 1 This will be useful
because it will enable us to contrast the mirror image fault system
both with true no-fault systems (what I have called strict liability sys-
tems), and with true collective deterrence systems.
The mirror image of the fault system would begin with the rule
that all losses lie on injurers.20 This "absolute" liability rule would
achieve "optimal deterrence" only (a) if the injurer classes were always
better suited to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident and
accident avoidance costs, or (b) if there were no transaction costs. These
are the analogues of the two "incredible" assumptions required to
make the fault system's starting point, the no-liability rule, achieve
our goal.21 Once again, however, a modification would be available.
"Victim Negligence"-that is, a finding by a court, jury, or legislature,
that victim avoidance would have been less expensive than the accident
costs-would justify placing the incentive to avoid such accidents on
the victim. This is simply the reverse of the fault system, which starts
with all losses borne by the victim and shifts the liability to injurers
when they are at fault. Since we are reversing the fault system, the
only effect of such a collective decision that avoidance is desirable
would be to put the market incentive to avoid the accident on the
victims rather than the injurers. If we were to pursue the mirror
image further, we would refuse to apply this Victim Negligence re-
striction on basic injurer liability when the injurer was also negligent;
this would function in the hypothesized system precisely as contribu-
tory negligence functions in the current fault system. Victim Negli-
gence would also fail to shift the burden from the injurer unless the
victim's negligence was a proximate cause of his own injury. Finally,
certain types of injurer behavior which the regulators could in no
sense say were wrong, negligent, or not worthwhile, would nonetheless
justify leaving the burden and the incentive on the injurer despite
the fact that avoidance by the victim was clearly worthwhile, and non-
avoidance clearly wrong. Injurer "assumption of risk" would have
its due.
Apart from having very different distributional effects from the
fault system (injurers instead of victims would bear the burden of
those accidents which were deemed not worth avoiding), this mirror
image fault system would be very similar to the actual fault system.
19. See, e.g., Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 207-09.
20. See p. 657 supra.
21. Id.
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With two exceptions, it would be about as close, and as far, from
reaching the goal of "optimal deterrence" as the fault system. One
can question whether it would have greater or fewer administrative
costs.2 2 And we can ask the crucial and totally non-fault related ques-
tion of whether as a starting point victim or injurer categories are
better suited to avoid accidents in the absence of a regulatory deci-
sion that the opposite category should avoid a particular accident.
Apart from these, the system would have essentially the same flaws
that the fault system has, and the same advantages.
Regulatory errors would have the same effect as before on achieving
our goal. So would errors in judgments by members of the class on
which the loss would lie. Accidents which would be worth avoiding
only through joint action by injurers and victims would be avoided
only if transaction costs were very low. Moreover, even in the ab-
sence of error or joint action problems accidents would frequently be
avoided in more costly ways than necessary. Nevertheless, if one is
emotionally wedded to the particular mixture of market incentives
and collective decisions which the fault system represents, and yet re-
jects the distributional effects of the system, then this mirror image
fault system is the appropriate approach.
VII. The Strict Liability Approach
A quite different approach is that which I have in the past called
"strict liability"-but which should emphatically be distinguished from
absolute injurer liability. This approach would ask, both at the starting
point of liability and at how ever many exception levels are deemed
appropriate: Who is best suited to make the cost-benefit analysis be-
tween accident costs and accident avoidance costs? In other words, it
would ask who should bear the incentive to decide correctly, rather
than what is the correct decision. Whether the starting point would
be victim incentives or injurer incentives is, as a theoretical matter,
an open question. That currently there is a strong trend toward injurer
liability as a starting position is evident. It began with ultra-hazardous
activity liability, moved through workmen's compensation, and is cul-
minating today in product liability and in part in automobile plans.23
22. Leaving all accident costs on victims entails fewer administrative costs than shifting
all accident costs to injurers. This is no way implies, however, that the actual fault system
entails fewer administrative costs than would the mirror image fault system. Compare
O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76-77 (M. Howe ed. 1963), with CosTs, supra note 1,
at 261-62; cf. Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 209.
23. No-fault automobile plans are in my terminology strict liability systems. They are
not, however, primarily systems in which injurer liability is the starting position. The
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But whether this trend is appropriate (as I am inclined to think) is
a matter of empirical judgments, not theory. Similarly, the breadth and
generality of the applicability of the starting position-the number
of exceptions made to the original "incentive placement" rule, and
whether their applicability is to be decided by classes or on a case-by-
case basis-is also an open issue. It would be determined through em-
pirical judgments concerning the administrative costs of making ex-
ceptions and the importance of such exceptions. This last, in turn,
would depend on the likelihood that the "other" category could best
make the cost-benefit analysis in significant classes of situations.
I would suggest that "strict liability" has always approached the
problem in this way. Characteristically, once the starting position of,
say, injurer liability has been established, exceptions have also been
recognized. Since the system is a strict liability rather than a mirror
image fault system, they have only rarely been defined in terms of
Victim Negligence. That is, the "exceptions" continued to ask the
characteristic strict liability question of who was best suited to bear
the incentive, to make the cost-benefit analysis and act on it, and
not the fault system's standard question of how the analysis should
come out in the judgment of some regulators. But these exceptions
have nonetheless been fundamental. One need only think of master-
servant liability, and of the independent contractor exception to it,
and then of the non-delegable duty exception to it, and finally of the
"scope of the non-delegable duty" limitation to realize how sensibly
these decisions were approached. 24 Furthermore, while contributory
negligence was only rarely a defense in strict liability cases, defenses
which sounded like "assumption of risk," "nonproximity of cause," or
which argued "this was not the type of accident which caused us to
make liability strict in the first place," were frequently accepted. This
again suggests that the original decision to put incentives on injurers
was limited by courts and legislatures whenever victim categories
seemed better suited to decide and the administrative costs of making
exceptions were not too great.
An example of the difference between a mirror image approach
and a true strict liability approach may be useful. A rotary mower
throws stones, a person uses it where there are stones, and is injured.
car owner or operator is required to insure himself against injuries. To that extent, these
plans start with victim liability. The owner or operator is also required to insure
pedestrians and his passengers. With respect to these victims, injurer liability is the
starting point; cf. Posner, Strict Liability, supra note 2, at 212.
24. To say that the approach was sensible obviously does not imply agreement with
the specific line-drawing which occurred.
667
HeinOnline -- 84 Yale L.J. 667 1974-1975
The Yale Law Journal
The now generally applied starting position is manufacturer liability.
The issue of whether to reverse this starting point could be decided
on the basis of whether the user was negligent in mowing where there
were stones. This would be a mirror image fault approach. By con-
trast, a strict liability approach (through the use of notions like "de-
sign defect," "adequacy of warning," and "assumption of risk") would
focus on whether the user or producer belonged to the class best suited
to bear the incentive toward safety, apart from whether in this case
or in many cases the particular victim did something which we can
collectively say ought not to have been done. Consider now the same
mower manufacturer, and consider also a user who wants to mail a very
important letter. His car won't start, he has no bicycle, and the post
office closes in five minutes. He decides to ride the mower to the post
office. The mower collapses and he is injured. It is perfectly possible
to design mowers which would not collapse when driven on the high-
way. Again'one could, absurdly, ask whether mailing the letter was so
important as to justify, i.e., make non-negligent, riding the mower
down the street. Yet to let anything turn on that question would be
to miscast the issue. The general starting point that manufacturers of
mowers are better suited than users to decide for or against safety
devices (implicit in the original decision to have products liability)
should be reexamined in the light of the particular type of use, re-
gardless of whether that use was justified or not. The necessary doc-
trine is again easily at hand; not improper use (mailing the letter may
have been very proper if it was important enough), but unexpected,
unusual, or extraordinary use can support the desired exception.
VIII. Two Advantages of Strict Liability
I have described in some detail elsewhere the advantages of using
this non-fault approach and the factors relevant to making the non-
fault liability decision.25 But I think it is worthwhile to draw atten-
tion here to two advantages which have not been the subject of as
much discussion as other, perhaps more important, ones.
The first concerns the "coalitional problem," that is, those accidents
whose avoidance can best, or indeed only, be achieved by action on
the part of both injurer and victim. Once one is no longer constrained
by trying to decide whether avoidance by either the victim or injurer
is worthwhile (a decision the fault system requires), then the problem
25. See, e.g,., COSTS, supra note 1; Calabresi-Hirschoff, supra note 1.
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is readily solved. It is perfectly possible to determine that in certain
categories of accidents the cost-benefit decision can best be made, and
acted upon, if part of the costs are borne by the injurer and part by the
victim. Strict liability, as I have defined it, is in no way limited by
any requirement that all the loss must lie on one class or the other.
Nor are strict liability decisions limited to dividing the loss, where
division is appropriate, in a purely quantitative way. Rather, one may
hold that the desirability of avoiding the risk of certain types of dam-
ages is best determined and acted on by victim classes, even though
the injurer can best make and act upon the necessary cost-benefit
analysis for the accident itself and the basic damages that flowed from
it. I shal not discuss the correctness of some strict liability decisions
which have limited damages to economic losses, or have applied doc-
trines like assumption of risk to bar recovery of certain types of eco-
nomic damage suffered by very special categories of victims. Their
correctness depends on the accuracy with which they determined which
category was best suited to make the cost-benefit analysis for the spe-
cific types of damage involved. It is enough to point out that the
approach lends itself to such divisions in the arrangement of incen-
tives, and hence is readily suited to dealing with the problem of acci-
dents whose costs are best avoided, if at all, by decisions taken inde-
pendently by both injurers and victims.
A second advantage of strict liability derives from the effect of errors
by the regulators. In strict liability systems, unlike the fault system
and its "mirror image," regulator error affects accidents in an un-
biased way. I said earlier that the "overestimate" of prevention costs
by regulators (resulting in improper failure to impose liability on the
injurer) would not be cured in the fault system because, given such
error, there would be no incentive for the injurer to prevent even
readily avoidable accidents.206 The same would be true for regulator
overestimates of victim prevention costs in the mirror image fault
system. On the other hand, underestimates of prevention costs in
either system would be without effect, because the fault systems do
not coerce compliance with their decisions that avoidance is worth-
while; as a result, injurers (in the fault system) and victims (in the
mirror system) would iguore regulator underestimates of prevention
costs when it suited them.
There is, however, no reason to assume a priori that regulator under-
estimate of avoidance costs is more frequent than regulator over-
26. See p. 661 supra.
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estimate. Indeed, if one thinks of the possibility of developing new
safety devices and the difficulty that regulators have in thinking in
such dynamic terms, the opposite seems more than plausible. It would
seem to me, therefore, misguided to rely on the ability of regulators
not to overestimate prevention costs, as both the fault systems do,
while giving parties to accidents the opportunity to reconsider, as it
were, de novo, any possible underestimate. Our objective is more likely
to be approached if we look for those sorts of situations in which
regulators make errors of both kinds, that is, those in which regulators
are unlikely to know whether avoidance is worth it or not. In these
situations, putting the incentive on the class which is best suited to
make the determination of whether avoidance is worthwhile seems
much more likely to avoid error than would making a guess that
avoidance was or was not worthwhile. It is precisely in these broad
categories of situations, when we are uncomfortable with collective
decisions that accident avoidance is worthwhile by'either party, that
we should apply strict liability systems.
IX. The Role of Collective Deterrence
But what of those accident costs whose avoidance, whether by in-
jurers or victims, is clearly worthwhile? What of those occasions in
which there is general agreement with the regulators' decisions that
prevention should have occurred or that the dangerous act was not
worth doing? The answer is that even in those cases the fault system
does not function as well as would a system of noninsurable civil or
criminal fines, imposed regardless of the individual accident costs.
The reason is obvious: The fault system regulators do not coerce com-
pliance with their decision once they decide that prevention is worth-
while. They rely instead on attaching an incentive, viz., "the costs of
such accidents," to the class which "should" prevent them. But this
unnecessarily opens up the possibility of error on the part of that
class in gauging whether compliance is, in fact, worthwhile..2 7 To
some extent, a decision on whether to comply is always a matter of
choice on the part of the people society is trying to coerce.28 Yet
27. "Error" in gauging whether compliance is worthwhile may stem fW'om subjective
desire to engage in the "faulty" behavior. If this subjective desire violates a strongly held
collective view, then it is as much an error as an overestimate of prevention costs would
be. For example, we correctly say that a drunk errs if he decides that drunken driving is
more desirable than not combining driving and drinking. If, instead, the intensity of the
desire suggests that the collective judgment for prevention was incorrect or doubtful, then
we are no longer dealing with cases where "we are sure that avoidance by victims or
injurers is worthwhile." And strict liability, rather than fault, is appropriate.
28. See note 14 supra.
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who can seriously assert that the most effective way of preventing be-
havior that we have collectively decided to prohibit is to charge the
actor's insurance company for the damages that behavior happens to
cause? Thus, the fault system is far too tentative in enforcing those
very judgments between prevention and accident costs which its regu-
lators are reasonably sure are correct.
Assuming the goal is "optimal deterrence"-the minimization of the
sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs-we are very likely
to do better if (a) when we are certain that prevention is worthwhile,
we coerce prevention, and (b) when we are uncertain, we attach in-
centives to decide whether prevention is worthwhile to that class which
is best suited to decide the question. The fault system (or its mirror
image) does neither-it requires a regulatory decision on whether pre-
vention is worthwhile, even when that decision is not worthy of much
reliance, and then fails to enforce that decision even when it is.
Perhaps the minimization of accident and prevention costs is not
the proper goal. It surely is not the only objective of accident law. I
have elsewhere discussed other goals which I, for one, deem every bit
as important.20 My object in this article was not to speculate about
what all the relevant objectives, taken together, require. It was, rather,
to set out schematically the ambivalent way in which the fault system
approaches the goal of "optimal deterrence" and to suggest how very
differently a combination of strict liability and "collective" prohibi-
tions might approach that same goal.
It may seem ironical to emphasize, in an article in honor of Fleming
James, that goal which, of all the goals of accident law, has been least
attended to in his writings. I think not, however, for it is precisely
because he focused his attention elsewhere that this goal, of all the
goals of accident law, has remained most in need of careful analysis.
29. See note I supra.
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